Can a Regional Mediator Sort out the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: Turkey on Stage

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Abstract
President Obama's recent visit to Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Jordan attempted to jump-start the stalled peace negotiations and made a very bold point by first resolving the dispute between Turkey and Israel. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey maintained a good relationship with both the Israelis and the Palestinians and is a strong candidate for the role of mediator in their protracted conflict. Some qualities that support her bid include a good economic, commercial and military relationship with Israel; historic, cultural and religious ties with the Palestinians; a supportive Sunni majority; a strong alliance with the US and NATO membership and willingness to act as a mediator to reinforce its position as a regional power.

Key Words: Israel, Palestine, Turkey, mediation, negotiations, Ottoman Empire

Background of Relations in the 20th Century
After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the Republic of Turkey underwent a very fast and profound process of reform of the state, including establishing
governing principles of secularism and representative democracy, along with comprehensive legal, economic and land reforms, language, literacy and even family names or clothing. The Turkish society, in decay for centuries and finally defeated with the Allied Invasion of Istanbul in 1920, was now again, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on a path of progress and affirmation, first at home and then in the regional and international arena.

In this context, the emerging Turkish Republic prioritized strategic interest and economic development over nostalgia or paternalistic affiliation for the population and problems of Palestine as an ex-colony. This policy of disengagement, before and after the take-over by the British Empire in the form of their Mandate for Palestine (1919-1947) was just the natural position of a defeated empire, trying to redesign itself as a regional power. All its subsequent actions in the Middle Eastern platform, and especially with regards to Israel and Palestine have to be understood in this context.

The reciprocal positioning of modern Turkey and the State of Israel since its declaration of Independence on the 10\textsuperscript{th} May 1947 have some important thresholds for the subsequent relation between each of them and the Palestinians, as well as for the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. For the \textit{statu nascendi} which Palestine is claimed to be, it is important when regional powers or the late and the new colonial powers talk, in what terms and what they talk about. And it matters for the whole world, because the Israeli-Palestinian struggle for land and peace is no longer a local or regional conflict. Since the Palestinian problem was put on the Global Agenda in 1988 with the \textit{Declaration of Independence of Palestine}\textsuperscript{1} and increasingly with the First

and Second Intifadas or the deaths of Yasser Arafat\textsuperscript{2}, Yitzhak Rabin and other leaders – recently and notably Ahmad Jabari\textsuperscript{3} - the Middle East conflict is a compulsory statement in Western elections for candidates to leading positions, as was patent in the last US elections.

The current changes in the relationship between Turkey and Israel have to be understood in the context of the cyclical frost and thaw they have experienced since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Turkey was the first Muslim majority country to recognize Israel and since then relations improved – broadly speaking – until the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s the disappearance of the USSR from the bipolar structure of power and the re-ordering across regional axes offered both Turkey and Israel the opportunity to affirm themselves and leave aside occasional antipathies for strategic and economic gains. Cagri Erhan and Omer Kurkuoglu (2010: 868-871) outline five principal reasons for the thaw in relations, ranging from ideological and diplomatic to military and economic:

1. The desire to affirm and increase their regional power in the prospect of a new regional order with the Peace Process in the Middle East seemingly advancing.
2. The Turkish effort to attract the support of the Jewish lobby, primarily in the US, but also in several European countries, for a range of issues such as the continuous Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus or the standing towards the alleged Armenian Genocide.
3. The natural alliance between two democracies who both had tensions with Syria, Iran and Iraq (Turkey because of the Kurdish issue, Israel for geo-strategic, political and religious reasons).

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid. 1 Avnery notes:“[B]eyond personal considerations, Arafat was the man who was able to make peace with Israel, willing to do so, and – more importantly - to get his people, including the Islamists, to accept it. This would have put an end to the settlement enterprise. That’s why he was poisoned”.

\textsuperscript{3}Israel’s targeted killing of 14/11/2012 gave rise to a 12 days war between Israel and Hamas, killing 5 Israelis and 148 Palestinians, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/why-did-israel-kill-jabari.premium-1.482224 retrieved 28/11/2012
4. In its assiduous drive to modernization and westernization, Turkey felt closer ties with Israel, embarked on a similar accelerated development project, than with other autocracies or dictatorships in the Middle East, which opened numerous formal and non-formal cooperation paths between the two.

5. Both were attracted to contributing to the US-led New World Order in the Middle East in order to ensure for themselves the best positions possible. This drive was fueled, in the case of Israel, by the historical special relationship, and for Turkey through the increasingly pro-active approach of the US for reaching this goal (through soft and hard-power measures, classical and public diplomacy as well as military intervention). As a member of NATO from 1952, but also following an extended collaboration with the US, it was only natural for Turkey to approach Israel, itself an aspiring member of NATO, but already having the most significant military, technological and economic cooperation with the USA globally.

**Highlights of the Turkish-Israeli Relation**

Historically, the relationship between the two regional powers has been tighter in secrecy than it was shown to the media and the public. The first *Intifada* (1987-1993) triggered the condemnation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly towards "the violent actions of the Israelis against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the inhuman violation of Palestinians' human rights". Furthermore, Turkish foreign minister Mümtaz Soysal announced in 1994 that what Israel calls terrorism is in fact Palestinians "trying to defend their rights". Another incident which rose eye brows and upset Tel Aviv was the 1994 visit of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller to the Palestinian leadership, without Israel's authorization.

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4Gruen, G. "Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations," Israel Affairs, Summer 1995, p. 50
Notwithstanding these minor incidents, most of them in response to Israeli misconduct vis-à-vis Turkey, the decade of the 1990s saw a flourishing of political and economic cooperation. The 2000s, however, started badly, with an April 2000 decision of the Israeli government to introduce information in textbooks about the Armenian Genocide, denied by the Republic of Turkey. In response, no member of the Turkish cabinet attended the customary Israeli National Day Reception in Ankara on the 10th May 2000. Another severe blow was dealt by the Gaza Freedom Flotilla incident on the 31st May 2000, when the Israeli Defense Forces attacked a humanitarian aid convoy sailing to Gaza, in which eight Turkish and one American citizens were killed. Prime Minister Erdogan requested an official apology and compensation for the bereaved families from Israel, which were never received, as well as an end to the blockade of Gaza. Since Israel was unwilling to do so, the mutual boycott of celebrations and suspension of diplomatic relations continued and intensified between the two states until Obama's last-minute intervention in March 2013.

Another unpopular episode both with the Turkish public and the Islamic government of Erdogan (in power since 14/05/2003) was the US-led elimination of Saddam Hussein. Although a NATO member since 1952, Ankara declined involvement in the invasion of Iraq, for reasons of regional, religious and popular apathy.

The trigger for the major deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey was the 2008-2009 Israeli invasion of Gaza, which resulted in the death of 1,407 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, as well as

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the destruction of more than half of the infrastructure in Gaza. Turkey saw this aggression as highly detrimental for the peace process in the Middle East and conditioned the resumption of diplomatic relations by a full state apology and comprehensive compensation for the Mavi Marmara Flotilla victims, as well as lifting the blockade in Gaza. It was only in March 2013 that US President Barack Obama managed to persuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to comply with Turkish demands – not yet implemented, which are based on standard norms of international law, confirmed by the UN both for the flotilla and for the Gaza blockade, and thus resume full diplomatic relations.

**What can Turkey Bring to the Negotiating Table?**

A balanced historic relation with both Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Palestinians. Even if the main consideration remains strategic interest and the desire to consolidate its regional power position, Turkey is no outsider to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Turkish UN Delegate illustrated the balanced position that was to be Turkey’s foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine question in an address prior to the 1947 Partition vote: both in the Middle Ages and during the Second World War, the Jewish community lived prosperously and in full possession of all civil liberties in the Palestinian Territory. The double sided interest was expressed as the preference of Turkey that the Jewish Agency remained a community, rather than a state and at the same time, “the Turkish nation sincerely desires to see the new Arab states happy and prosperous.” For this as well as other considerations, such as the fear of a strong left-wing and pro-Russian inclination of a

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10Ibid.
possible Jewish state, Turkey eventually voted against the UN Partition Plan for Palestine\textsuperscript{11}.

\textit{Good economic ties.} Although the Welfare party in Turkey is traditionally more suspicious of Zionism, and therefore of close ties with Israel, Ankara has been trying to increase, rather than halt cooperation and solidarity with Islamic countries. Nonetheless, two important agreements were signed with Israel as early as 1997, while the Welfare Party was in power. Despite diplomatic tensions, trade increased from \$449 million in 1996 to more than \$1.2 billion in 2002. This remarkable acceleration continued with bilateral trade increasing 14.6\% per year, on average, from 2002 to 2008. From 2010 to 2011, trade increased by 30.7\%, far surpassing the growth that occurred during the height of Turkish-Israeli ties.

On the Palestinian side, in addition to in-kind contributions of food of \$6.6 million, Turkey also provides financial support to UN Relief and Works Agency. Since 2009, the Turkish Government has more than doubled its contribution to the agency, reaching an annual sum of \$1.25 million in 2012\textsuperscript{12}. Turkey also chairs the Working Group on Financing UNRWA in New York, and is a member of the Advisory Commission comprising UNRWA’s major governmental supporters, thus extending a helping hand whenever possible.

\textit{Participation in International Bodies for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.} Between 1948-1962 Turkey was a member of the Palestine Conciliation Committee, a last minute cover-up body created by the British Administration before withdrawing (Eran, 2002:126). This Committee ultimately failed to achieve any of its goals, but it was still the first indication of a desired active neutrality from Turkey.


The extensive collaboration with Israel visibly impacted Turkey’s relationship with the other Arab states, but Ankara’s policy of balance was reinstated by a rapprochement towards the Palestinians during and after the Second Intifada in 2000. It was formalized as president Suleyman Demirel became a member of the UN Investigation Committee appointed to look into the uprising, which produced the Mitchel Report: Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque on the 28th September 2000, escorted by over 1,000 police officers fueled intense protests from Muslim believers in Turkey, as well as a bold diplomatic message from leaders of Islamic states.

A further action aimed at regaining its essential neutrality for any significant role in a mediation process is the 7 October 2000 Turkish vote in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1322 against Israel, condemning the above-mentioned incident. Turkey then hardened its position during 2001-2002.

Mediation efforts. After the election of Ariel Sharon on the 6th February 2001, the Turkish effort for mediation was stepped up, with Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, commuting between Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Egypt, trying to resume a policy of neutrality and resolve the problem of fluctuating relations with Israel and the Arab world, which was creating increasing tensions with both.

After the election of Hamas in Gaza, in what were widely regarded as free and fair elections, Erdoğan declared: "Hamas must be disarmed […] Hamas had some habits. But these are old. Hamas has to give up old habit and attitudes, because they will manage a

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15 Tunisia, Morocco and Qatar severed their relations with Israel, Egypt and Jordan recalled their Ambassadors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pledged funds for the Palestinians and many Arab countries airlifted injured Palestinians to their hospitals. Maddy-Weitzman, B., “The Arab World and the Al-Aqsa Intifada” Tel Aviv Notes (23/11/2000).
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Ankara recognized the unrest caused by the emergence of a Hamas government in Tel Aviv and again offered to mediate: “Turkey can carry the role of mediator between Israel and Palestine in the new era”. This offer has not greatly inspired any of the parties, since no major ensuing activity is reported.

After the successful UN bid for upgrading Palestine’s status to non-member state, Recepp Erdogan offered himself to Israel, Palestine and the international community as a mediator, with no response as yet. He considered the voting so important, that he sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu to convey the message: “It is not an option but an ethical, political, strategic and legal obligation for the international community to recognize the right to self-determination and the right to a state granted to the people of Palestine by a resolution adopted by the United Nations in 1947”. Thus he also recalled the basis of international law upon which the Turkish help would be based.

The vision presented by Ankara offers “a flexible, but values-based strategy since the beginning of the process and presents a common vision to parties of a dispute”. Furthermore, Turkey pledges competence on all dynamics of the problem and long-term commitment, which is congruent with all the arguments presented above.

17 Ibid.
18 The minister further added: “the non-member observer state status is just an initial step and that the oppression and injustice having been imposed on the people of Palestine for decades will not be considered as complete until the flag of the Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital, waves, as a full member, in the United Nations among the other flags, on the basis of a two state solution reached through peace within the borders of 1967”. Retrieved 20/11/2012 from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-it-is-not-an-option-but-an-ethical.en.mfa
Turkey’s efforts to increase their know-how in mediation and global awareness on its importance for the conduct of international relations include initiating the first UN resolution on mediation (2010), organizing the “Friends of Mediation Group” under the auspices of the UN (with 42 members as of June 2012) and a series of international conferences entitled “Enhancing Peace through Mediation”

According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey attaches special importance to preventive diplomacy, pioneers a great deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and endeavors actively for the peaceful settlement of disputes. [It considers preventive diplomacy to be] the most effective and economic method in terms of settlement of disputes, but also from the reality that reduction of potential disputes and conflicts will directly contribute to Turkey’s development.

Its portfolio of mediation efforts have included conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Furthermore, Turkey has an ideally suited location at the crossroads between Asia, Africa and Europe, with participation in fora and councils belonging to these three continents and beyond. Due to all this experience, regional peace interest, as well as its common history with Jews and Palestinians, Turkey can be the ideal mediator between Israelis and Palestinians.

Similar problems. The Turkish problems with the Kurds were at their height in the 1990s, and the military, diplomatic and economic collaboration with Israel was seen as an attempt by the two powers to exchange not only tactics, but possible solutions to the problems. However, the nature of the historic, religious and cultural relationships was different, as were the military power and the aims and visions of sustainability of the two states regarding the groups under their control or occupation. Nevertheless, Turkey has

20 Ibid.

21 For a detailed analysis of the parallels between the PKK and PNA’s relationships to Turkey and Israel respectively see “Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006”, Oran, 2010.
managed to deal with its issues in a quite satisfactory manner, whereas Israel has been unable or unwilling to reach an end to their conflict with the Palestinians. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Ankara found out that Tel Aviv was arming and training the Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq. Turkey was shaken and very troubled by the news, and severed diplomatic ties further.

A series of high-level meetings and official visits were exchanged by the Turkish and Palestinian leaderships in 2012: Prime Minister Erdogan received a Doctor Honoris Causa PhD from Al-Quds University of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{22} and President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkish Parliament\textsuperscript{23}. In the midst of harsh criticism that it should give and do more for the Palestinian cause\textsuperscript{24}, Turkey was fast to offer 6.6 million USD for food aid.

**Conclusion**

Turkey was the first Muslim state to formalize relations with the State of Israel upon its creation in 1948. Since then, the relations between these two only ‘democratic’ and ‘non-Arab’ states in the region (Ergemir, 2010:25) have evolved, both in substance and in their influence on regional forces. At the same time, Turkey has good relations with the Palestinians and other nations in the Middle East. But Israel’s reaction to the Palestinian UN bid for an upgrade of status, as well as the pre-emptive aggressions on Gaza left the relations between the two regional powers limping again.

Aware of their part of guilt, Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli prime minister, declared since 2011, in an interview with Maclean’s: "Israel deeply regrets the deterioration in our relationship


with Turkey. We want to try to turn things around, and we hope that the Turks will be a partner in that effort.\textsuperscript{25}

There seems to be a pattern of proportionality in the responses of Israel and Turkey to each other’s actions, which seems to be a special treatment, “only for friends” that Israel doesn’t share with other states in the area. Its intrusive and excessively violent attitude towards other states is inversely proportional to their size and power. This was the Israeli mode of interaction in the South Sudan secession, 1982 Lebanon invasion, Jordan, Egypt and others. But the enduring economic relations and strategic alliance have maintained the friendship with Turkey. Such friendship is an excellent base for a mediator in the conflict, and this article has presented some economic, geographic, historic and strategic aspects of this cooperation, as well as a pallet of arguments in favor of Turkey mediating between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Turkey has been softly making the statement, gathering points and building its CV as a mediator, but it is probably time that it made a direct bold and assertive offer, and an indirect point to international actors. Turkey can show explicitly the great potential for making significant advances in the conflict-resolution process through its involvement at such a delicate moment in the existence – in the end last days - of the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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